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Jurisdictional Statement
The Court is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)
Issues Presented for Review and
Standard of Appellate Review
Appellee B. Ray Zoll ("Zoll") is presenting no issues for review.
Mm i

ii
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suggested standards of review.
In regards to Castleton's Issue # l \ Issue #2
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only be set aside upon a showing of "clear erroi
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:
order to set aside the

Trial Court's Findings of Fact, this Court must "decide that the factual
findings made

* adequately supported by the record,

resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's determination." State v. Pena. 869 t-

i

1994)(citations omitted). The application of the facts to law is "reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness." Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. Contrary to
Castit..
1

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll was not serving as
legal counsel for Castleton at the time Zoll represented another client in the
collection of a debt from Castleton?
2
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the matters at issue in
Zoll's previous representation of Castleton were not substantially factually
related to the matter on which Zoll represented a client adverse to
Castleton?
3
Whether the uidi court erred in concluding that Zoll did not breach his
fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality and good faith to Castleton?
l

limited because this Court has a "special interest in administering the law
governing attorney ethical rules" under Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962
P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998). This is not an attorney disqualification case nor is
it an action brought by the Bar for violations of ethical rules. This is a civil
case of alleged attorney malpractice for breach of fiduciary duty giving rise
to a claim of money damages. The "Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are
not designed to create a basis for civil liability." Archuleta v. Hughes, 969
P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998). The Trial Court's discretion should not be
reduced because a civil cause of action has been alleged against an attorney.
The Trial Court should therefore be granted broad discretion because of the
number of the factual disputes presented at trial and because the Trial Court
was in a better position to consider and weigh the evidence. Houghton v.
Deot. of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998).
In regards to Castleton's Issue #4 4 , the issue is based upon the
Findings of Fact of the Trial Court and the Trial Court's application of the law
to those facts. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court can only be set aside
upon a showing of "clear error." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. The application of
the facts to law is "reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." Pena, 869
P.2d at 938. The Trial Court should be granted broad discretion because of
the nature of the factual disputes and because the Trial Court was in a better

4

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll's misconduct
was not the proximate cause of Castleton's claimed damages?

2
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Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998).
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances or Rules
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules
whose interpretation is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on
appeal.
Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the Case. Contrary to Castleton's assertion, this is

jse of a lawyer who betrayed his client nor doe

f

the ethical rules established by the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility.
This is a case of a former client suing his former attorney for malpractice
based ii| II II i , in ullt '()<'( I I II i MI 11 ol In IIH i,n y duly
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embezzler suing his victim and his former attorney to get back the
restitution he voluntarily provided. This case centers on the activities of

$72,000.00 from Nathan Ricks and the NS Group, a then current Zoll &
Branch client. Castleton, the convicted thief, and his fiancee, Suzanne
Roderick ("Roderick") concocted a "sham" lawsuit in an effort to extort from
his victim, Ricks, and his former attorney, Zoll, unsubstantiated damages
allegedly ' - u l l f i r d 11 >, i dsllelim
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tin I

nil

with his embezzlement, Castleton first admitted his wrongdoing and offered
restitution, and then several months later reversed his position and seeks to

3

blame Zoll, his former attorney, for the fact that he was being held
accountable for his embezzlement.
Zoll had previously represented Castleton on three (3) matters. Zoll's
representation of Castleton ceased when Castleton failed to pay Zoll and Zoll
terminated the attorney-client relationship. Almost a year after the
attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton had ended, Zoll and
Ricks met with Castleton in Zoll's office to confront Castleton with his
embezzlement from Ricks. Castleton immediately admitted to the
wrongdoing and agreed to make amends by entering into an agreement to
make restitution, return Ricks' proprietary information and provide Ricks
with some collateral to serve as security for his promise to repay the
$72,000.00 in stolen funds. Following the meeting, Ricks and Castleton
(without Zoll) went to Castleton's home and Ricks took possession of various
items of personal property Ricks was led to believe by Castleton belonged to
him. Castleton was present, agreed to give Ricks the items and even helped
Ricks load the items into his vehicles. Before leaving Zoll's office, Castleton
and Ricks had agreed to provide Zoll a list of collateral to be incorporated
into the agreement. Castleton and Ricks failed to provide the list of items.
Some ten (10) days after the initial meeting, Castleton met with his fiancee
Roderick's attorney and executed a document pledging all of the items that
Ricks' had taken possession of to his fiancee. The next day Castleton
knowingly and voluntarily executed a written agreement prepared by Zoll to

4

pay back the money and granted a security interest in the same property to
Ricks. Castleton and his fiancee, Suzanne Roderick, then set up a "sham"
lawsuit to sue each other as Plaintiff and Defendant to recover the collateral
given to Ricks as restitution and pledged to Roderick. The lawsuit named
Ricks and Zoll as co-defendants on the pretext of alleged wrongdoing by Zoll
and Ricks in holding Castleton to his agreement. Throughout the entire
case, Castleton and Roderick (as Plaintiff and Defendant) cooperated in the
filing of joint motions against Zoll and Ricks. At trial, the Court found that
Castleton and Roderick had secret agreements (drafted by their attorneys)
relating to the transfer or ownership of certain assets in an attempt to
enhance their claims for damages against Zoll and Ricks. Whenever they
thought it necessary Castleton and Roderick would assign the assets from
one to the other to further that scheme.
Castleton misstates the true nature of this action. This is a case about
an admitted thief and his fiancee creating a "sham" lawsuit to get a claimed
money damage award of $50 to $100 million against an attorney who
breached no duty owed to Castleton.
The Trial Court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and view the evidence. The Trial Court clearly found (1) that no
attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and Castleton at the April 8,
1996 meeting (Finding No. 25, R. 1758), (2) that no confidential or
information not generally known was shared with Zoll as a result of his

5

previous representations of Castleton (Findings No. 3 1 , R. 1760), and (3)
that the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case
were not substantially factually related to the matter involving Castleton's
theft of money from Ricks (Findings No. 29, R. 1759). Finally, (4) the Court
found that there was no causal link between Zoll's conduct and any damages
that Castleton claimed to have sustained and that Zoll had nothing to do
with Ricks' alleged non-consensual taking of the property, the alleged
damage to the property while in Rick's possession, or the circumstances of
Ricks failing to return property. Findings No. 34, R. 1760 and Findings No.
36, R. 1761. Based upon these Findings, the Court properly concluded that
Zoll did not Breach his Fiduciary Duty to Castleton.
B.

Statement

of Facts.

1. Zoll represented Castleton on three matters: (a) a hearing in
Castleton's Bankruptcy (the "Bankruptcy Action"), (b) filed an answer in a
collection case and gave the Court notice of the automatic stay caused by
Castleton's bankruptcy (the "Collection Case"), and (c) represented
Castleton in a contempt proceeding and in a petition to modify his divorce
decree (the "Post-Divorce Action"). Finding Nos. 1, 2, and 3 at R. 1753.
2. On October 4, 1994, Zoll represented Castleton at a hearing in
the Post-Divorce Action. Trial Exh. E. At the hearing, the parties stipulated
to a full resolution of the pending petition to modify the divorce decree.

6

Trial Exh. E. The Stipulation was read into the record of the Court. Trial
Exh. E.
3. On January 24, 1995, an order memorializing the stipulation was
filed with the Court and submitted to Zoll by opposing counsel. Trial Exh. 7.
4. On February 14, 1995, Zoll filed an objection to the form of the
order. Trial Exh. 9. The Objection was only to the form of the order that
memorialized the in court stipulation of the parties and centered on the
insertion of four (4) phrases. Trial Exh. 9.
a. In paragraph A, the word "or decrease" was to be added. R.
1984 at p. 352 line 23 -353 line 3.
b. In paragraph B, the word "reserved" was to be replaced with
"dismissed." R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 4-8.
c. In paragraph D, the phrase "support determined by the court
at that time" was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 19-23.
d. In paragraph F, the phrase "shall obtain" was to be replaced
with "has obtained." R. 1984 at p. 353 line 24- 354 line 4.
5. The Hearing on the objection to the Proposed Order
memorializing the stipulation was struck by the Court on the Court's on
motion on April 28, 1995. Trail Exh. 11. The Court further stated in the
minute entry that there would be a determination whether the matter will be
ruled upon, or heard by Judge Rokich or by Judge Bohling as Judge Rokich
was in the process of retiring. Trial Exh. 11. No further action was taken by

7

Zoll on the Post-Divorce Action. R. 1985 at p. 648 lines 3-19. Castleton told
Zoll to drop the objection shortly thereafter. R. 1983 at p. 54 lines 15 -57
line 10.
6. Zoll obtained no confidential information from Castleton during
the scope of their relationship that was not already publicly known in the
Post-Divorce Action or the Bankruptcy Court files. Finding No. 31 at R.
1760.
7. Zoll did not share any information (other than that Zoll had
previously represented Castleton in a divorce proceeding) with Ricks. R.
1984 at p. 451 line 15- 452 line 10.
8. Zoll did not give Ricks any information about Castleton's assets
or property (even though they were included as a public record in
Castleton's Bankruptcy schedules and in the files in the Third District Court).
R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19.
9. Ricks did not know that Castleton had declared bankruptcy in
1994 until the bankruptcy was brought up during Trial in 1999. R. 1984 at
p. 452 lines 2-6.
10.

The Trial Court found that Castleton could not cite to any

evidence of specific information that Zoll would have obtained in his
representation of Castleton that was either confidential or that was not
otherwise generally known. Finding No. 31 at R. 1760.

8

11.

The Trial Court concluded based upon the evidence and

credibility of the witnesses that "Zoll received no confidential information
form Castleton during the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action or the
Collection Case, which benefited Ricks in the subsequent representation
against Castleton." Conclusion No. 7 at R. 1762.
12.

No legal services were performed by Zoll on Castleton's

behalf on any case after February 14, 1995.5 R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19
and R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8.
13.

On May 24, 1995, a final decree was entered in the

Bankruptcy Action, the case was closed, and the attorney-client relationship
between Zoll and Castleton on that matter terminated. Finding No. 2 at R.
1753, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Trial Exh. D.
14.

On June 13, 1995, notice was provided to the Court that

the Collection Case was stayed by the automatic bankruptcy stay, the case
removed from tracking, and the attorney-client relationship between Zoll

5

Castleton attempted at trial and is attempting in his brief to claim that
"legal services" were performed on Castleton's behalf on 3/21/96. However,
that allegation clearly misstates the evidence. The April 1, 1996 billing
clearly shows that the services were for a "runner fee." Tr. Exh. 27. On
March 2 1 , 1996, a runner picked up some books for Joe Rawie and mistakenly
billed Mr. Castleton $10.00 (one hour of the runner's time) unbeknownst to
Zoll and totally unrelated to any legal work for Castleton. R. at 1350. Zoll
Depo at 67, 76-77. The testimony consistently throughout this case and at
trial was that the fee was mistakenly charged to Castleton's account
unbeknownst to Zoll and that no legal services were performed on
Castleton's behalf after February 14, 1995. R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8.
9

and Castleton on that matter terminated. Finding No. 3 at R. 1753, Finding
No. 25 at R. 1758 and Trial Exh. A.6
15.

On August 2, 1995, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising

Castleton that he was delinquent on his bill, demanding payment and
stating:
In any event, if you do not make arrangements with our
office to begin payment on your bill within two (2) weeks
from the date hereof, I will have no other option but to
withdraw as your counsel in the matters that this law
firm has represented you and to pursue collection of
this amount from you. . . If you wish to make
arrangements with our office to begin payment on your legal
bill, in order to continue to receive my services as your
attorney, please contact my office immediately.
Trial Exh. 21 (Emphasis added).
16.

Although Castleton made one payment of $100.00, he did

not make the required arrangements to pay the bill. Findings No. 5, 6, 7 at
R. 1754.
17.

The Trial Court found that Castleton did not make

arrangements to trade printing services in exchange for legal services as
Castleton claimed. Findings No. 9-105, 6, 7 at R. 1754-55.
18.

The Trial Court found that after considering all the

evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses that the attorneyclient relationship on the Post-Divorce Action ended when Castleton failed to

6

It is interesting to note that up to and through the trial Castleton claimed
that the Collection Case and the Bankruptcy Action were still active as of
April 8, 1996. R. at 1256.
10

comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding No.
25 at R. 1758 and Conclusion No.2 at R. 1761.
19.

Eight (8) months after the attorney-client relationship

between Zoll and Castleton terminated for Castleton's failure to make the
required payments and fourteen (14) months after Zoll ceased performing
legal services for Castleton, there was a meeting at Zoll's law office
concerning Castleton's embezzlement from his employer Nathan Ricks
("Ricks"). Conclusion No. 2 at R. 1761, R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19, and
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755.
20.

Zoll informed Castleton that the meeting was to discuss his

employment relationship with Ricks' company the N.S. Group. Finding No.
l l a t R . 1755.
21.

At the meeting, Zoll again reminded Castleton that he did

not represent him, but rather that he represented Ricks. Finding No. 12 at
R. 1755.
22.

At the April 8, 1996 meeting, Zoll did not threaten

Castleton with criminal prosecution and did not threaten to call the Sheriff
and have Castleton arrested as Castleton claimed. Finding No. 12 at R.
1755.
23.

Zoll believed that the attorney-client relationship had

ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995
Letter and based upon Castleton's statements to him regarding the

li

objection. R. 1983 at p. 144 lines 14-17, R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-23 Trial
Exh. C, Finding No. 3 at R. 1753, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 and Trial Exh. A.
24.

Castleton knew that the attorney-client relationship was

over before the April 8, 1996 meeting. Trial Exh. G ("Affiant [Castleton]
believed up until about April 8, 1996, that Defendant B. Ray Zoll represented
Affiant") and R. 1984 at p. 402 lines 17-20.
25.

Castleton could not have reasonably believed or

subjectively believed that Zoll was his attorney at the April 8, 1996 meeting
because he had received written and verbal notice of the termination of the
relationship. Finding No. 26 and 27 at R. 1759.
26.

The Court found that Zoll was not prohibited from

representing Ricks against Castleton because Castleton's theft of
approximately $72,000.00 was not substantially factually related to the
Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, or the Collection Case. Finding
No. 29 at R. 1759.
27.

Castleton was not placed at any disadvantage in the

matter of the theft of money from Ricks by virtue of any alleged confidential
information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation of Castleton.
Finding No. 30 at R. 1759.
28.

At the meeting, Castleton suggested that he would be

willing to give Ricks equipment and property as a trade off for the money
that he had embezzled. R. 1983 at p. 128 lines 2-20.
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29.

After the meeting, Ricks and Castleton agreed that Ricks

would follow Castleton to his home and obtain whatever computer hardware
and software were necessary to preserve NS Group's data which was on
Castleton's computer, and also to obtain other property to hold as collateral
for repayment of the embezzled funds. Finding 13 at R. 1755.
30.

Ricks took possession of his data, computer and other

electronic equipment as security for the debt that Castleton owed Ricks.
Finding No. 13 at R. 1755. Zoll did not go with Castleton and Ricks to
Castleton's home. Finding No. 13 at R. 1755.
31.

Zoll did not tell Ricks what to seize and Ricks decided (by

himself and without any information from Zoll) to seize anything of value.
R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19 and R. 1985 p. 478 line 21-479 line 1. Zoll
did not participate in the consensual acquisition of items and allowed
Castleton and Ricks to work out the property issue which Zoll would later
incorporate into the April 19, 1996 agreement.7 R. 1983 p. 131 lines 3-7
and R. 1983 p. 136 lines 2-5.
32.

Zoll had nothing to do with the alleged taking of the

additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while in Rick's

7

This is the reason that the April 19, 1996 Agreement did not contain any
exhibits. Castleton and Ricks were to create an Exhibit A and Exhibit B to
the Agreement. Castleton and Ricks never did agree on what should be on
Exhibits A and B and therefore no Exhibits were attached to the Agreement.
R. 1984 at p. 457 line 16-458 line 24.
13

possession, or the circumstances or Ricks failing to return property. Finding
No. 36 at R. 1761.
33.

Zoll could not have reasonably foreseen that Ricks would

not return the property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would
damage property in his possession. Finding No. 37 at R. 1761.
34.

Castleton failed to produce any evidence that showed a

causal link between the conduct of Mr. Zoll and any damages that Castleton
may have sustained. Finding No. 34 at R. 1760.
35.

On April 9, 1996, Zoll sent Castleton a "Notice of

Termination" that clearly states that Zoll and Branch were acting as
attorneys for Nathan Ricks and NS Group. Trial Exh. 25 and Finding No. 15
at R. 1756.
36.

On April 18, 1996, after meeting with Roderick and her

attorney Castleton signed the UCC-ls for the same property that Castleton
had earlier given to Ricks as collateral for the promised restitution on April 8,
1996. Castleton Depo. at 143 -150.
37.

On April 19, 1996, Castleton went to the offices of Zoll &

Branch and reviewed, edited by interlineations in his own handwriting and
signed a settlement agreement memorializing the events of April 8, 1996.
Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 and Trial Exh. 26.
38.

That settlement agreement states "said property was

consensually given to Ricks for security purposes and is being held by

14

agreement pending execution of this agreement" and "Castleton represents
that he is not a party to any other agreement which would prevent him from
entering into this Agreement or which would adversely affect this Agreement
or the performance of any services hereunder in any manner." Trial Exh.
26.
39.

Castleton never mentioned to Zoll or Ricks that he had

signed UCC-ls in favor of his fiancee the day before he executed the
"Settlement Agreement" or that he could not in good faith execute the
"Settlement Agreement" under paragraph 11 because of the UCC-ls he
executed the day before. Zoll Depo at page 147 line 25 to page 148 line 5.
40.

The Court found that Castleton was under no undue duress

or pressure to sign the agreement. Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 and Trial Exh.
26.
41.

Castleton argued to the court in his sentencing hearing

during the criminal proceeding on the embezzlement that the property given
to Ricks should be and was used as a set-off towards the money that he
took from Ricks (even though he was suing Ricks in this case for damages
for taking the property). Trial Exh. B and R. 1983 at p. 174 lines 8-20.
42.

On July 11, 1996, Roderick (Castleton's fiancee) initiated

this action and sued Zoll and Ricks claiming that she was the true owner of
the items Castleton gave to Ricks on April 8, 1996 and that Ricks and Zoll
converted her personal property, security interest, and destroyed her

15

property. R. 1-42. Roderick attached the UCC-ls that Castleton had signed
(after delivering possession of the property to Ricks) as evidence of her
ownership of the property. R. 37, 39, and 40.
43.

In August 1999, Ricks, Castleton, and Roderick settled

their claims against each other and Ricks returned all the items he took from
Castleton. Trial Exh. Q and R. 1984 at p. 455 lines 15-25.
44.

Castleton claims that he is entitled to damages against Zoll

for all the items that he gave to Ricks on April 8, 1996 and were not
returned by Ricks or damaged by Ricks. R. 1985 at p. 463 lines 20-25.
These items allegedly include compact discs, computer equipment, phones,
cables, software, laser discs, etc.8 Trial Exh. 29.

I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
CASTLETON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
OF FACT.
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn the

trial court's findings of fact. Castleton continues to assert only such facts as
are favorable to him to demonstrate alleged instances of "Zoll's misconduct"
and ignores all other contrary evidence. The facts Castleton argues are
clearly contradicted by the weight of the evidence at trial and the Trial

8

When Ricks was asked about the property he allegedly took and did not
return that was listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 29, Ricks stated "then they were
never there because we returned everything we had in our possession." R.
1984 at p. 455 lines 21-25.
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Court's Findings of Fact. In order for Castleton to establish clear error in the
Trial Court's findings of fact, he must first marshal all the evidence that
supports a particular finding of fact by the trial court and then marshal all
the evidence that shows that the particular fact is clearly erroneous.
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence and has simply cited only the
facts favorable to his position. This failure alone is a fatal defect to
Castleton's appeal.
II.

CASTLETON FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY OF THE ELEMENTS
OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER KILPATRICK.
Castleton did not meet his burden at trial to establish an attorney-

client relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting. The trial court was correctly
persuaded that Zoll did not breach any duty owed to Castleton, as a former
client, by representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00
because Zoll's prior representation of Castleton was not the same or a
substantially factually related matter. Moreover, Zoll had not obtained any
confidential information from Castleton nor shared any confidential
information (assuming that he obtained some) with Ricks. Finally, Castleton
was unable to persuade the Trial Court that Zoll's actions were the actual
and proximate cause of Castleton's damages. Ricks' actions of allegedly
taking more than Castleton consented to, damaging the property he took,
and not returning that property were the actual cause of Castleton's
damages. The Trial Court correctly found and concluded that Zoll had
nothing to do with those damage claims. Zoll was not aware that Ricks was
17

going to take more property than he originally agreed to nor could Zoll know
that Ricks would damage or fail to return property. The Trial Court was
correct in finding that Ricks actions presented an independent intervening
cause of Castleton's alleged damages. As such the Trial Court correctly
found that Castleton failed to demonstrate any damage incurred as a
proximate result of Zoll's actions.
III.

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DO NOT PER SE ESTABLISH CIVIL
LIABILITY.
Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to find that the Trial

Court's Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous and that Zoll did breach a
duty owed to Castleton, Zoll still cannot without a further showing of proof
be held to be subject to civil liability for merely violating the Utah Rules of
Professional Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and principles of
attorney disqualification govern this case. Castleton reasons that because
Zoll could not have represented Ricks and Castleton simultaneously
(assuming that Castleton's attorney-client relationship with Zoll was not
terminated) that Zoll is therefore, ipso facto, responsible for $50 to $100
million dollars in unsubstantiated damages. Contrary to case law precedent
decided by this Court, Castleton argues that Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Utah
Rules of Professional Responsibility provide an independent basis for civil
liability and bypass the traditional standards of proof. The Utah Rules of
Professional Responsibility are not a trump card that would allow Castleton
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to bypass his burden of proving liability, damages, and the causal link
between them.
I.

ARGUMENT
CASTLETON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
REQUIRED TO SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT # 1 1 , 12, 16, 25-27, AND 36.
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to set aside the

Trial Court's Findings of Fact # 1 1 , 12, 16, 25-27 and 36. Castleton "must
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack."
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of fact, the
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings...." Grayson Roper Ltd. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The marshaling requirement
provides the appellate court the basis from which to conduct a meaningful
and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal. See Wright v. Westside
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n. 2 (Utah Ap.1990).
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Castleton has chosen only to present the facts he considers favorable
to his position and ignores his duty to marshal all of the facts for this Court.
Castleton asserts numerous facts in his brief that are clearly contradicted by
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and seems to simply assert that because
the Trial Court did not agree with him it must therefore be wrong.
For example, Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll set up an
"ambush." This claim is contradicted by Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. The
Court found that
[b]efore the meeting, Zoll called Castleton and asked him to
meet with he and Ricks about his employment relationship with
Ricks' company the N.S. Group. Zoll did not advise Castleton
that they were going to confront him at the meeting with an
allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks.
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. The Court also found that as of April 8, 1996,
Castleton knew or reasonably should have known that Zoll had severed the
relationship and did not represent his interest. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758,
Finding No. 26 at R. 1759, and Finding No. 27 at 1759. Finally, Castleton
knew that he was stealing from Ricks and was going to Ricks' attorney's
office to discuss his employment with Ricks' company. Trial Exh. B and
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. These findings are supported by the August 2,
1995 termination letter, the testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances
the testimony of Castleton. R. 1983 at p. 108 lines 1-9, R. 1983 at p. 110
lines 11-14, Trial Exh. 26, R. 1983 at p. 173 lines 3-20, and R. 1985 at p.
473-478.
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Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll "simultaneously" represented
Castleton and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting. This claim completely
ignores Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court finds, under all the
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorneyclient relationship between Zoll and Castleton."), Finding No. 26 at R. 1759
("The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the
time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship
existing between them."), and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. ("The Court finds
that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the
April 1996 meeting and after."). These findings are supported by the
transcript of the meeting, the settlement agreement, the notice of
termination, and the credible testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances
the testimony of Castleton. Trial Exh. 24, Trial Exh. 26, Trial Exh. 25, R.
1985 at p. 657 lines 9 - p. 659 line 5. Trial Exh. G, R. 1984 at p. 361 lines
22-25, R. 1984 at p. 402 - p. 403 line 25.
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll threatened Castleton at the April
8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if Castleton did not
cooperate in the civil action. This claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No.
12 at R. 1755 ("Zoll advised Castleton at the meeting that his conduct was
criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not threaten to call
the Sheriff and have Mr. Castleton arrested, as Castleton claims."). This
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finding is supported by the tape transcript of the meeting, the credible
testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances the testimony of Castleton.
Trial Exh. 24, R. 1984 at p. 451 lines 10-14, R. 1985 at p. 447 lines 22-25,
and R. 1985 at p. 478 lines 3-5.
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll "orchestrated" Ricks' consensual
acquisition of Castleton's property. This claim is clearly contradicted by
Finding No. 36 at R. 1761 ("There is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll had
anything to do with the taking of additional property, the damage while in
Rick's possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that
he had agreed to return."). Castleton erroneously claims that Zoll facilitated
the efforts of Ricks to seize more property that Castleton had allegedly
originally agreed to. The Trial Court found "Ricks took possession of the
data and of substantial computer and other electronic equipment as
security." Finding No. 13 at R.1756. The Trial Court found that "Zoll did not
go with Castleton and Ricks to Castleton's home." Finding No. 13 at R.1756.
The Trial Court found that "[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll
had anything to do with taking of additional property, the damage
while in Rick's possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to
return the property that he had agreed to return." Finding No.36 at
R.1761 (emphasis added). Finally, the Trial Court found that "it was not
foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return property that he had agreed
to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his possession." Finding
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No.37 at R.1761. These findings are clearly supported by the credible
testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instance the testimony of Castleton.
R. 1985 at p. 476 line 4 - p. 479 line 1, R. 1983 at p. 186 lines 8-14, R.
1983 at p. 135 line 25 - p. 136 line 5.
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll pressured or exerted undue
influence on Castleton to force him into signing an agreement that
acknowledges that the taking of property by Ricks was "consensual." This
claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 ("The Court finds
that the agreement was entered into by Castleton, knowingly and
voluntarily, and that he was under no undue duress or pressure to sign the
agreement."). The record clearly states that the agreement memorializing
the events of April 8, 1996 was executed eleven (11) days later and after
Castleton had been to a different attorney's office and executed a conflicting
document the day before at his fiancee's request. R. 1985 at p. 697 and R.
1988 at p. 143-150, and Finding No. 16 at 1756.
Castleton asserts in his brief that his $100 payment met the
requirements of the August 2, 1995 Termination Letter and that he later
made arrangements to pay his bill by giving printed materials to Mr. Rawle.
This claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court
finds, under all the circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there
was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton.") and
Finding No. 10 at R. 1755 ("The Court finds that no such agreement was

23

made, and that no materials as testified by Castleton were delivered to Mr.
Rawle for delivery to Mr. Zoll in payment of his legal bill."). These findings
are clearly supported by the stipulated testimony of Joe Rawle and Janeal
Lindeman and the credible testimony of Zoll, and in many instances the
testimony of Castleton. R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-13, R. 1984 at p. 372 line
4 - p. 387 line 3, R. 1985 at p. 664 lines 5-24, R. 1984 at p. 382 line 23 p. 383 line 19.
Castleton did not point out that the Trial Court viewed the lawsuit
between Castleton and Roderick as a "sham" and found that Roderick and
Castleton joined forces to bolster claims against Zoll. Finding No. 22 at R.
1758. The evidence showed that Castleton never answered Roderick's'
complaint and Roderick failed to pursue any claim against Castleton until a
Default Certificate was entered by Roderick against Castleton on September
13, 1999 (more than three (3) years after the complaint was filed). R.
1690-1691. Castleton failed to mention that the evidence also showed that
Castleton and Roderick were engaged to be married and lived together
during the pendency of the action while acting as Plaintiff and Defendant. R.
1983 at p. 150 lines 3-14.
Castleton failed to state that the Default Judgment (entered against
Zoll for Zoll's alleged failure to comply with discovery requests) was set
aside because Zoll had in fact responded to the discovery requests. R.769770 and R. 1126-1129. Moreover, the Court set aside the Judgment
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because Roderick and Castleton failed to follow Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-504 and submitted the "Order Granting Joint Motion"
for Default Judgment against Zoll without first submitting it to Zoll to
approve as to form. 9 R.1020-1055. The Court found Zoll had responded to
the discovery requests but ordered Zoll to pay Castleton's attorney's fees
reasonably incurred after July 6, 1998 for his failure to state that the
exhibits sought by the requested document did not exist. 10 R. 1088, 11931196.
Castleton failed to point out that during the pendency of the lawsuit
Roderick and Castleton (as Plaintiff and Defendant) effectuated at least five
(5) transfers of the assets between them that served as the basis for
Castleton's damage claims. R. 1985 at p. 409-415. These transfers
occurred at various times throughout the litigation when it seemed to suit
needs of either Roderick or Castleton to bolster either Castleton or
Roderick's damages claims.11 Finding No. 22, R. 1758.

9

Note that there is no space for Zoll or Ricks to approve as to form on the
"Order Granting Joint Motion." R. 896.
10
July 6, 1998 was the date of a letter specifically requesting the nonexisting exhibits to the document. R. 849. In response to that letter,
Counsel for Zoll provided another copy of the document without exhibits to
Castleton rather that affirmatively state that no exhibits existed. R. 919 and
R. 1893 at p. 136 line 14-23.
11
For example, when the Default Judgment was entered against Zoll, the
assets where transferred to Roderick to bolster her claims of damages. After
the default was set aside and Roderick's claims against Zoll dismissed by
Summary Judgment, Roderick transferred the assets to Castleton to enhance
his damages.
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Castleton failed to state that, Castleton argued to the court in the
criminal proceeding at his sentencing hearing that the materials
consensually acquired by Ricks constituted restitution or were at least a setoff towards the money that he took from Ricks (even though he was
currently suing Ricks for damages based upon his taking of that property).
Trial Exh. B and R. 1983 at p. 174 lines 8-20.
If Castleton wished to overturn these findings, Castleton must first
show what evidence was available to the Court and that the Trial Court's
findings were clearly erroneous. To prove that the trial court's findings of
fact were clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor
of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Castleton has not done this.
If an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, "the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds
to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." Id. at 199. Castleton has failed to
marshal the evidence required to find that the Trial Court's findings of fact
are clearly erroneous. Because Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence
in regards to any of the Trial Court's Findings of Facts, this Court must
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assume the record supports the findings of the trial court and not allow
Castleton to argue facts in this appeal not found by the Trial Court.
II.

CASTLETON FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY OF THE ELEMENTS
OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER KILPATRICK.
Castleton did not establish any of the elements of breach of fiduciary

duty under Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996). Castleton argues that he does not have to prove actual or
proximate cause and that this Court can simply assume an attorney-client
relationship, assume confidential information was exchanged and violated,
and thereafter assume that damages occurred. However, that misstates the
standard of the law for legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty.
The essential elements of legal malpractice based on breach of
fiduciary duty include the following: (1) an attorney-client
relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the
client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4)
damages suffered by the client.
Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App.

1996).
Castleton argues that the Kilpatrick case is not the controlling
authority in this case and asserts that this Court should instead apply Von
Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632
(Utah 1984) and Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758
(Utah 1988). This position is incorrect because (1) Kilpatrick clearly sets the
standard for the alleged malpractice of an attorney based upon a breach of
fiduciary duty, and (2) Von Hake. Baker and Wheeler all deal with "self
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dealing" by a fiduciary and each case presents distinguishable factual
situations from this case.
First, Kilpatrick is squarely on point. In Kilpatrick, the Utah Court of
Appeals reviewed the case law on legal malpractice actions in Utah and
concluded, "Utah law therefore recognizes legal malpractice actions based on
breach of fiduciary duty." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289. The Court of
Appeals then sets forth the four (4) essential elements of legal malpractice
based on breach of fiduciary duty. Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289. Clearly,
this case involves an allegation of legal malpractice against an attorney
based upon an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. R. 1983 at p. 5 lines 19-23.
The Trial Court in this case correctly applied the standards set forth in
Kilpatrick.
Second, the Trial Court was correct in using the standards set forth in
Kilpatrick because Von Hake, Baker and Wheeler are all significantly factually
distinguishable from the issues that were before the Trial Court. Von Hake
dealt with a man, Ed Thomas, who convinced (through alleged undue
influence) an 82-year-old Von Hake to deed to Thomas his property. 12 In
Baker, the personal representative of grantor's estate brought an action to
12

The Von Hake Court found that Thomas did not breach any fiduciary duty
to Von Hake because no confidential relationship between Thomas and Von
Hake existed. The Court did find that Thomas defrauded Thomas. It is
interesting to note that even though Thomas' attorney, Ronald C. Barker,
"orchestrated" the transfer by preparing the deed and urged Von Hake to
sign the deed without assistance of counsel that the cause of action was
brought against only against Thomas and not Barker, the attorney. Von
Hake, 705 P.2d at 768.
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cancel warranty deed from Baker to Pattee based upon undue influence. In
Wheeler, a trustee was sued for investing trust assets in his own companies.
Von Hake. Baker, and Wheeler, all deal with "self dealing" by a fiduciary.
These cases simply do not apply to the instant action. First, the Trial Court
found after receiving and weighing all of the evidence that no undue
influence or pressure was placed upon Castleton to sign the April 19, 1996
Settlement Agreement. Finding No. 16 at R. 1756. Second, the Trial Court
found that no attorney-client relationship existed between Castleton and Zoll
at the April 8, 1996 meeting or thereafter. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758.
Third, there is no "self dealing" in the April 19, 1996 Settlement Agreement
because Ricks was the beneficiary of that Agreement. Zoll was not selfdealing as a fiduciary and Zoll would have received payment from Ricks for
his legal services (charged by the hour) regardless of whether Castleton
signed the April 19, 1996 Settlement Agreement or not. As such, Kilpatrick
sets forth the correct legal standard for this case and the trial court correctly
applied that standard.
A.

THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED
THAT THERE WAS NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP AT THE APRIL 8, 1996 MEETING.

In order for Castleton to prove that Zoll had breached his fiduciary
duty Castleton would need to prove the existence of a current express
attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton contemporaneous
with the attorney-client relationship with Ricks on the same or a
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substantially factually related matter, or the Court must imply the existence
of an attorney-client relationship because Castleton provided confidential
information to Zoll which confidence Zoll thereafter breached. Castleton
could prove neither at trial.
Castleton did not establish that an attorney-client relationship existed
at the April 8, 1996 meeting. The Trial Court found that after considering all
the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses that there was no
attorney-client relationship on April 8, 1996 and concluded that attorneyclient relationship ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of
the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 and
Conclusion No.2 at R. 1761.
Moreover, the Trial Court found that "neither Zoll nor Castleton
subjectively believed at the time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an
attorney-client relationship existing between them." Finding No. 26 at R.
1759. The Trial Court also found that "objectively speaking that Castleton
could not reasonably have any expectation that an attorney-client
relationship with Zoll at the time of the April 1996 meeting and after."
Finding No. 27 at R. 1759.
These findings involved numerous factual disputes that required the
Trial Court to carefully consider the evidence and weigh the testimony of
many witnesses. "Where courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual
disputes, and the quantity of less-tangible factors implicating the trial court's
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decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better position to consider and
weigh all those circumstances in their application to the legal standard at
issue. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998)(citations
omitted). Accordingly, considerable discretion should be give to the Trial
Court's Findings of Fact.
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16, an
attorney may withdraw from representation of a client for nonpayment of
fees if the client has been given adequate warning. Utah R. Professional
Conduct 1.16(b)(4). Zoll ceased performing legal services for Castleton on
February 14, 1995 almost fourteen (14) months prior to the April 8, 1996
meeting. Eight months prior to the April 8, 1996 meeting, Castleton
received Zoll's August 2, 1995 letter placing Castleton on notice of Zoll's
intent to withdraw if payment in full or a payment schedule satisfactory to
Zoll was not made and followed. Trial Exh. 21. Castleton failed to make
payment in full or failed to make and keep current a payment arrangement.
The evidence showed that Castleton made no arrangements or consistent
payments (other than a single $100.00 payment in September 1995).
Castleton claims he made an arrangement between himself, Joseph Rawle
and the Zoll & Branch Secretary, Janeal Lindeman, whereby Zoll would
accept trade with Rawle for goods and/or services Castleton provided to
Rawle. Zoll, Rawle, and Lindeman all disputed any such an arrangement
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and the Trial Court found from contradicting testimony that no arrangements
were ever made. Finding No. 10 at 1755.
Castleton argues that because no formal "Notice of Withdrawal" was
filed in the Post-Divorce case at the time of the April 8, 1996 meeting that
Zoll was therefore still representing Castleton.13 This evidence was
presented at trial and the Trial Court found that "under all the
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorneyclient relationship between Zoll and Castleton." Finding No. 25 at R. 1758.
Zoll had not performed any work for Castleton since February 14, 1995. R.
1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8 and R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19. Castleton did not
comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding
Nos. 5, 6, and 7 at R. 1754 and Finding No. 10 at R. 1755. Zoll and
Castleton knew at the April 8, 1996 meeting that the attorney-client
relationship was over. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Finding 26 at R. 1758, and
Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. The fact that Zoll did not file a formal "Notice of
Withdrawal" did not alter the Court's factual finding that Zoll terminated the
attorney-client relationship with Castleton when he failed to comply with the
terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. See Barry v. Ashley
Anderson, P.C., 718 F. Sup. 1492, 1494 (D. Colorado 1989)(finding
attorney-client relationship ended before attorney formally withdrew from
,3

Zoll filed a formal "Notice of Withdrawal" on November 22, 1996 in
response to receiving a "Re-Notice of Hearing" on the objection to the form
of the order filed by Mrs. Castleton's attorney in the Post-Divorce Action.
Trial Exh. C.
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representation in pending matter). See Also Ganser v. Corder, 980 P.2d
1032, 1035 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)(findinc attorney-client relationship ended a
month before attorney formally withdrew based upon conduct of the
parties).
Whether an attorney-client relationship exists for any specific purpose
can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. See Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Scope. On February 13, 1995, Zoll filed an
objection to the form of a Proposed Order. The Objection was only to the
form of an order which memorialized an in-court stipulation and centered on
the insertion of four (4) phrases. In paragraph A, the word "or decrease"
was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 352 line 23 -353 line 3. In paragraph B,
the word "reserved" was to be replaced with "dismissed." R. 1984 at p. 353
lines 4-8.

In paragraph D, the phrase "support determined by the court at

that time" was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 19-23. In paragraph F,
the phrase "shall obtain" was to be replaced with "has obtained." R. 1984 at
p. 353 line 24- 354 line 4. Those four phrases "or decrease," "dismissed",
"support determined by the court at that time'" and "has obtained" were the
only questions before the Court. More importantly, the parties had entirely
resolved the substantive issues by a stipulation that was read into the record
before the Court on October 4, 1994. Trial Exh. E. The Hearing on the
objection to the Proposed Order was struck by the Court on the Court's on
motion on April 28, 1995. The Court further stated in the minute entry that
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there would be a determination whether the matter will be ruled upon,
or heard by Judge Rokich or by Judge Bohling as Judge Rokich was in the
process of retiring. Trial Exh. 11 (emphasis added). Moreover, Castleton
told Zoll that he should not continue with the objection. R. 1983 at p. 54
lines 15 -57 line 10. Based upon the Court's striking of the hearing, Minute
Entry and Castleton's statements to Zoll, Zoll reasonably believed that his
representation of Castleton on the Post-Divorce case effectively terminated
when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995
Termination Letter. Finding No. 26 at R. 1759 R. 1983 at p. 144 lines 14-17
and R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-23. Based upon, Castleton's failure to comply
with the terms of the August 2, 1995 letter and Zoll's written and oral notice
to Castleton, Castleton knew or should have known that his attorney-client
relationship with Zoll had terminated. Trial Exh. G ("Affiant [Castleton]
believed up until about April 8, 1996, that Defendant B. Ray Zoll represented
Affiant"), R. 1984 at p. 402 lines 17-20, Findings No. 5, 6, 7 at R. 1754,
Findings No. 9-105, 6, 7 at R. 1754-55, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Finding
No. 26 at R. 1759, and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. Castleton later acting pro
se14 withdrew the objection to the form of the order and allowed the order to
be entered as originally written and submitted.

14

It is interesting to note that Castleton did not obtain another attorney to
represent him at the hearing on the objections to the form of the order even
though Castleton now claims that the objections to the form of the order
were of extreme importance and that Zoll was still representing him.
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The Trial Court appropriately concluded that the attorney-client
relationship between Zoll and Castleton was effectively over in August of
1995 when Zoll gave Castleton the required notice that he intended to
withdraw under Rule 1.16. The fact that Zoll failed to perform the formal
albeit perfunctory task of filing a Notice of Withdrawal does not change the
fact that Castleton was on notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as
of August 2, 1995. See Riqqs Natl. Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Calumetqussin N o . l . 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16475 (D.D.C.)(no current
representation despite fact that firm did minor work for client after suing it).
Zoll performed no legal work for Castleton after February 14, 1995. R.
1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19 and R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8. The fact that
Castleton failed to obtain another attorney on the objection and then later
withdrew the objection pro se further supports the conclusion that the
divorce case was essentially over and the objection was moot.
The evidence clearly demonstrated that no reasonable person could
have believed that an attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and
Castleton on April 8, 1996. Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. In order to
determine if an attorney-client relationship existed, the Court must view the
relationships as the client did at the time. Matter of Petrie, 742 P.2d 796,
801 (Ariz. 1987)("An important factor in evaluating the relationship is
whether the client thought an attorney-client relationship existed.") While
Castleton's subjective belief is important, w [h]owever, a party's belief that an
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attorney-client relationship exists, unless reasonably induced by
representations or conduct of the attorney, is not sufficient to create a
confidential attorney-client relationship." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe,
799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(emphasis added). Under Utah law,
Castleton's belief must be reasonable and must be reasonably induced by
the representations' and conduct of Zoll. The Trial Court found that Zoll
effectively communicated his withdrawal to Castleton by his statement that
absent payments he was terminating his attorney-client relationship with
Castleton. The Trial Court found that everything Zoll did after the August 2,
1995 Termination Letter was consistent with that statement. Castleton's
own conduct left no question that he did not meet the terms specified in the
August 2, 1995 termination letter in order to have Zoll continue as his
attorney. Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995
termination letter.
At the April 8, 1996 meeting, Zoll specifically stated that he was
representing Ricks and not Castleton. The Trial Court found that Castleton
could not reasonably conclude from the events of that meeting that
Castleton was being represented by Zoll at the meeting or afterwards. On
April 9, 1996, Zoll sent Castleton a "Notice of Termination" letter that clearly
stated that Zoll was representing Ricks. "The attorney-client relationship is
an ongoing relationship giving rise to a continuing duty to the client unless
and until the client clearly understands, or reasonably should
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understand, that the relationship is no longer to be depended on." In re
Weiner, 120 Ariz. 349, 352, 586 P.2d 194, 197 (1978)(emphasis added).
The Trial Court correctly found that Castleton knew or should have known
after the August 2, 1995 letter and certainly as of the April 8, 1996 meeting
that no attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and Castleton.
B.

ZOLL COMMITTED NO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
TO CASTLETON BECAUSE THE THEFT OF MONEY
FROM RICKS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY
RELATED TO THE PREVIOUS REPRESENTATIONS AND
BECAUSE ZOLL OBTAINED NO CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION FROM CASTLETON THAT HE
DIVULGED TO RICKS.

Zoll did not breach any duty to Castleton, as a former client, by
representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00. Zoll did
not obtain nor share with Ricks any information from Castleton that was
confidential. Castleton claims that Zoll violated Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1.9 by representing Ricks against him in his theft of $72,000.00.
Assuming arguendo, that the matters are substantially factually related,
Castleton is not entitled to civil damages against Zoll based solely upon a
violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.9. "Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct are not designed to create a basis for civil liability."
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998).
Moreover, the Trial Court reviewed and weighed the evidence
regarding the scope and depth of the Post-Divorce Case, the Collection Case,
and the Bankruptcy Action and found that those three cases were not
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substantially factually related to the case involving Castleton's theft of
$72,000.00 from Ricks. Finding No. 29 at R. 1759. Castleton failed to make
any plausible argument how he was placed at a disadvantage in the matter
of theft of money from Ricks by any confidential information Zoll could have
obtained in his previous representations of Castleton. Finding No. 30 at R.
1759.
Furthermore, the Trial Court found that Castleton did not give Zoll any
confidential information that was not already publicly available in the court
files of the Post-Divorce Action or the Bankruptcy Action. Finding No. 31 at
R. 1760. Moreover, Zoll did not share any information (other than that Zoll
had previously represented Castleton in a divorce proceeding) with Ricks. R.
1984 at p. 451 line 15- 452 line 10. Zoll did not give Ricks any information
about Castleton's assets or property (even though they were all included on
Castleton's Bankruptcy schedules and were also on file in the Third District
Court). R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19. Ricks did not even know that
Castleton had declared bankruptcy in 1994 until the bankruptcy was brought
up during Trial in 1999. R. 1984 at p. 452 lines 2-6. Castleton alleges that
he need not prove that any confidential information was exchanged but this
Court can merely assume (without any showing or proof) that it was
exchanged and assume that Zoll disclosed it. "However, a party must
show that ( 1 ) it submitted confidential information to a lawyer and
(2) it did so with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting as the
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party's attorney." Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 (10 th
Cir. 1994)(emphasis added)(finding submission of information and
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as the party's attorney required to
subject the lawyer to the ethical obligation of preserving confidential
communications).
Finally, every one of Castleton's allegations of Zoll's alleged
misconduct is clearly contradicted by the Trial Court's Findings of Fact.
Because Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn
the Trial Court's findings of Fact as clearly erroneous, this Court "assumes
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991). Castleton is arguing only his version of the facts that clearly
were not found by Trial Court. Castleton has made no effort to marshal the
facts. Castleton claims simply that Zoll "simultaneously" represented
Castleton and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting. This claim is clearly
contradicted by Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court finds, under all the
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorneyclient relationship between Zoll and Castleton."), Finding No. 26 at R. 1759
("The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the
time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship
existing between them."), and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. ("The Court finds
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that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the
April 1996 meeting and after.") Castleton claims that Zoll threatened
Castleton at the April 8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if
Castleton did not cooperate in the civil action. This claim is clearly
contradicted by Finding No. 12 at R. 1755 ("Zoll advised Castleton at the
meeting that his conduct was criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr.
Zoll did not threaten to call the Sheriff and have Mr. Castleton arrested, as
Castleton claims."). Castleton claims that Zoll "orchestrated" Ricks'
consensual acquisition of Castleton's property. This claim is clearly
contradicted by Finding No. 36 at R. 1761 ("There is no evidence whatsoever
that Zoll had anything to do with the taking of additional property, the
damage while in Rick's possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to
return property that he had agreed to return."). Castleton claims that Zoll
pressured Castleton into signing an agreement that acknowledges that the
consensual acquisition was "consensual." This claim is clearly contradicted
by Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 ("The Court finds that the agreement was
entered into by Castleton, knowingly and voluntarily, and that he was under
no undue duress or pressure to sign the agreement."). Accordingly, the trial
court properly concluded based upon the findings that Zoll did not breach
any fiduciary duty owed to Castleton.
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C.

ZOLL WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE AND ACTUAL CAUSE
OF CASTLETON'S ALLEGED DAMAGES.

Zoll's actions were not the actual and proximate cause of Castleton's
damages. Ricks actions of allegedly seizing more than was consented too,
damaging property, and not returning property were the actual cause of
Castleton's damages. Zoll was not aware that Ricks was going to allegedly
acquire more than he originally agreed to or that he would damage or fail to
return property under a subsequent agreement with Castleton. Ricks actions
are an independent intervening cause that prevents Castleton from seeking
damages against Zoll. "To prevail in legal malpractice actions, clients must
establish actual cause—that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not
have occurred—and proximate cause—that a reasonable likelihood exists that
they would have ultimately benefited." Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding
909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Regardless of whether or not
Zoll's actions at the meeting on April 8, 1996 constitute a breach of duty,
Castleton cannot establish any actual causal relationship to any allegedly
suffered loss. It is undisputed that the person who acted to take Castleton's
and or Roderick's property was Ricks and not Zoll. It is also undisputed that
Zoll never had possession of any of the items and was not even aware of
what Ricks had taken. Moreover, the evidence showed that Ricks either
returned the items taken or is under an executory contract to do so by virtue
of his settlement with Castleton on the eve of trial. There is, therefore, no
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causal link between Rick's actions (i.e. Castleton's damages) and Zoll's
conduct.
Castleton cannot show that any reasonable likelihood exists that he
would have been treated differently had Zoll not breached the alleged duty.
Castleton "must show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary
standards of professional conduct and had not breached fiduciary duties, the
client would have benefited." Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d
1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the instant matter, the actions of Ricks
were totally independent of Zoll's actions or inactions and were not caused
by them. Regardless of who represented Ricks on April 8, 1996, Ricks did
what he did thereafter of his own accord and without Zoll's knowledge or
involvement.

D.

CASTLETON SUFFERED NO DAMAGES AS A RESULT
OF ZOLL'S ACTIONS.

Castleton failed to demonstrate any damages because of Zoll's actions.
Castleton has already settled his claims with Ricks who was the actual and
proximate cause of the damages. Under the recent settlement agreement
between Ricks, Roderick, and Castleton, the parties agreed that Ricks either
had returned all property taken or would do so. Moreover, the pleadings
indicate that many, if not all, the items consensually acquired that night
belonged to Roderick and not Castleton. Roderick claims in her September
25, 1998 affidavit to be the owner of virtually all the property to be claimed
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as damages. R. at 957-960. Roderick's claims have been dismissed by this
Court as not valid against Zoll and Roderick did not appeal that Order.
Castleton must provide proof with "sufficient certainty that reasonable
minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the damages
were actually suffered." First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards,
Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1982). Castleton cannot show that Zoll
caused him any damage because there is no definitive proof that Ricks took
equipment that belonged to Castleton as opposed to property belonging to
Roderick. Roderick's subsequent transfer of her interest in all the property
consensually acquired by Ricks cannot be used to bolster Castleton's damage
claims against Zoll. Moreover, Ricks has already returned or is returning to
Roderick all the items consensually acquired from Castleton's Apartment on
April 8, 1996 as part of the recent settlement agreement. Any damages
done by Ricks are certainly not attributable to Zoll.
III.

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DO NOT ESTABLISH CIVIL LIABILITY.
Even if this Court were to find that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact

were clearly erroneous without being marshaled, Zoll cannot be subject to
civil liability for simply violating (assuming arguendo that Zoll did) the Utah
Rules of Professional Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and
principals of disqualification govern this case and that because Zoll could not
have represented Ricks and Castleton (assuming that the attorney-client
relationship with Castleton was not terminated on April 8, 1996) at the same
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time that Zoll is therefore responsible for $50 to $100 million dollars in
unsubstantiated damages.
Castleton argues that Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Responsibility in and of itself provides a basis for civil liability. The Utah
Rules of Professional Responsibility do not create standards for imposing civil
liability. Archuleta v. Hughes. 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 19981. Alternatively,
Castleton claims that Zoll breached his duty to Castleton is based on Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 "Conflicts of Interest: General Rule."
This is an administrative rule to be enforced solely by the Bar and under
Utah law no civil remedy is created thereby. Castleton claims that Zoll
breached his Fiduciary Duty by representing both Castleton and Ricks at the
April 8, 1996 meeting and afterwards. The basis for that claim is Rule 1.7 of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. It is significant that Castleton offers
no other authority under common law or case precedent for the creation of
such a duty. Rule 1.7 states "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client." In
the absence of Rule 1.7 there is no common law duty being breached by an
attorney representing two different parties in the same action at the same
time. In this case, Castleton's only claim is that Zoll breached his fiduciary
duty to Castleton by failing to follow Rule 1.7. The Rules of Professional
Conduct are not to be used as a basis for civil liability and Zoll cannot be
held civilly liable for alleged breaches of those rules.
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CONCLUSION
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn the
trial court's findings of fact. This, in and of itself, is fatal to his appeal.
Castleton continues to promote to the Court only facts favorable to his
position in an effort to convince the Court that Zoll is guilty of misconduct.
The alleged instances of "Zoll's misconduct" were clearly contradicted by the
weight of the evidence and the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. For Castleton
to persuade this Court to stray from the Trial Court's findings of fact, he
must first marshal all the evidence in support of that fact and then marshal
all the evidence that allegedly disputes that fact and show that the particular
finding by the Trial Court is clearly erroneous. Castleton has failed to do so
and has simply made unsupported and unsubstantiated statements
favorable to his position. Castleton's appeal must be denied on that basis
alone.
Under Kilpatrick, Castleton failed to establish any of the elements of
breach of fiduciary duty. Castleton did not establish an attorney-client
relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting. Castleton did not establish an
implied attorney-client relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting because Zoll
was not his attorney at that meeting eii er objectively or subjectively. Zoll
did not breach any duty owed to Castleton, as a former client, by
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representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00. Zoll did
not obtain any information from Castleton that was confidential. Zoll did not
divulge any information to Ricks regarding his prior representation of
Castleton other than the fact that he had represented Castleton in a divorce
proceeding. Moreover, Zoll's actions were not the actual and proximate
cause of Castleton's damages. Ricks actions of allegedly seizing more than
was consented too, damaging property, and not returning property that he
was required to were the actual cause of Castleton's damages. Zoll has not
aware that Ricks was going to seize more than he originally agreed to or that
he would damage or fail to return property. Ricks actions present an
independent intervening cause that prevents Castleton from seeking
damages against Zoll. Finally, Castleton failed to demonstrate any damages
because of Zoll's actions. Castleton has already settled his claims with Ricks
who was the actual and proximate cause of the damages.
Even if this Court were to find that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
were clearly erroneous, Zoll cannot be subject to civil liability for violating
(assuming arguendo that he did) the Utah Rules of Professional
Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and principals of
disqualification govern this case and that because Zoll could not have
represented Ricks and Castleton (assuming that Castleton's relationship was
not terminated) at the same time, therefore somehow Zoll is responsible for
$50 to $100 million dollars in unsubstantiated damages. The Utah Rules of
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Professional Responsibility do not create any such standards for imposing
civil liability.
Castleton argues that this Court should assume that an attorneyclient relationship existed because Zoll failed to perform a formal perfunctory
duty of filing a "Notice of Withdrawal" even after Zoll gave notice (both
verbally and in writing) to Castleton that he was no longer his attorney and a
year had pasted since Zoll preformed any legal work for Castleton. Based
upon that assumption, Castleton argues that this Court can then assume
that he gave Zoll confidential information. Castleton wants this Court to
further assume that Zoll misused the confidential information and wants
this Court to finally assume damages based upon that misuse without any
proof. This is not how the standards and burdens of proof are applied.
Castleton cannot prevail based solely on assumptions.
Both Zoll and Castleton knew that their attorney-client relationship
was over before the April 8, 1996 meeting. Zoll did not receive any
information about Castleton that was not otherwise publicly available (and
therefore no confidential) and Zoll did not reveal any information about
Castleton to Ricks. Finally, Castleton did not suffer any damages based
upon Zoll's alleged failures. At Trial and now on this Appeal, Castleton has
failed to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, Zoll respectfully requests that
Castleton's appeal be denied and Zoll awarded his attorney's fees and costs
in defense of this appeal.
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